Administrative Procedure by Culp, Maurice S.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 3
1955
Administrative Procedure
Maurice S. Culp
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Maurice S. Culp, Administrative Procedure, 6 W. Res. L. Rev. 201 (1955)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol6/iss3/5
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1954
Survey of Ohio Law-1954
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Notice of Rule Making
The Ohio Administrative Procedure Act purports to invalidate' any
administrative rule, amendment or rescission of a rule which does not
comply with the notice provisions of that statute. Because the Ohio Racing
Commission gave notice of a proposed rule making which did not amount
to a synopsis of the proposed rules, plaintiff claimed that the rules adopted
pursuant to this notice were invalid. The reviewing court, in sustaining
the validity of the rules, pointed out that the publication of a synopsis is
only an alternative method under the Act; and if, as in this case, a general
statement of the subject matter to which the proposed rule relates is set
forth in the notice, that is deemed substantial compliance with the statute.'
Furthermore, the court pointed out that a person who actually appeared at
and participated in the hearing could not complain that the notice did not
comply strictly with the statute.
The Ohio Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to rule making
by municipal administrative bodies. Notice requirements, if any, must be
found in specific legislation dealing with the particular matter involved,
The Revised Code requires that city boards of health, in promulgating their
rules and regulations affecting the public at large, adopt and publish them
in the same manner as municipal ordinances are adopted and published.4
These steps5 in principle are as follows:
1. A reading of the text of the proposed rule on three different days;
2. A formal resolution embodying the text of the rule must be passed
by a "yeas and nays" vote of the board;
3. Passage must be by an absolute majority of the membership of the
board;
Substantive and Procedural Problems under Workmen's Compensation are dealt
with under that title in the Survey. Attention should be directed at this point to the
fact that the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to the actions of the
industrial commission under Sections 4123.01 to 4123.04 inclusive of the Revised
Code. See O-Io REV. CODE § 119.01.
1 OHIO REV. CODE § 119.02. The procedure for adoption, amendment, or rescission
of rules is set forth in § 119.03.
'Standard "Tote," Inc. v. Ohio State Racing Commission, 121 N.E.2d 463 (Frank-
lin Com. Pl. 1954).
OIO REV. CODE § 3709.20.
'Brunner v. Rhodes, 95 Ohio App. 259, 119 N.X.2d 105 (1953). A number of
regulations were under attack; several were not sustained because of either a failure
to comply with the enactment provisions or because of a lack of substantive authority.
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4. The text of the rule must be published as in the manner of ordinances
and becomes effective 10 days after the first publication;
5. If the rule is of an emergency nature, it may be given immediate ef-
fectiveness when passed by a two-thirds vote of the board membership,
provided that the reasons for the emergency are set forth in a separate
section of the rule.
Thus a regulation which recites the reasons for the emergency separately
and which is passed by two-thirds of the board membership, is a proper
emergency regulation effective immediately upon passage. One court has
held a city board of health regulation to be a valid emergency measure, ef-
fective immediately, when approved by all but one of the board members,
though it actually names an effective date more than a month later.6
Construction of Rules and Regulations
The presumptions and construction accorded administrative regulations
by the courts are often decisive of their usefulness. This judicial attitude is
presented through several cases dealing with the regulations of the Board of
Liquor Control. In one case the court concluded that it is implied from
the act that no sales shall be made without a permit regularly issued, and
that all permits are subject to the regulations of the board. The board had
in practice interpreted the act as requiring a formal application to be acted
upon by it in every case. The court followed this construction, pointing
out that resort may be had to administrative construction by those executing
and applying the laws, especially where a consistent position is taken over
a considerable period of time.
In another case the court8 had before it a board action denying a liquor
permit in spite of vacancies within the applicant's district. The court
reasoned that inasmuch as the rules of the board validly enacted and promul-
gated have the effect of statues, rules of construction applicable to statutes
should apply. Thus the court is to give effect, if possible to all sections of
the regulation and to avoid constructions which will render any part mean-
'Ohio Revised Code Section 731.17, and for emergency matters, Section 731.30.
Under Section 731.20 an ordinary ordinance becomes effective not less than ten days
after the first publication required by Section 731.21.
*Brunner v. Rhodes, 95 Ohio App. 259, 119 N.E.2d 105 (1953). Under Ohio
Revised Code Section 3709.05, a city board of health normally consists of five mem-
bers appointed by the chief executive. Approval of a regulation by all but one
member means approval by four out of five, being more than the required two-thirds
majority required for an emergency ordinance.
TSiegel v. Board of Liquor Control, 95 Ohio App. 377, 119 N.E.2d 659 (1953).
It was held that the director did not exceed his authority in denying a permit by
reason of Regulation No. 64 of Liquor Control Board.
'Kenwood Country Club v. Board of Liquor Control, 122 N.E.2d 425 (Franklin
Com. P1. 1953).
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ingless or inoperative. Furthermore, regulations and sections of several dif-
ferent regulations in pari materia are to be construed together. Thus, taking
Regulation No. 64 and No. 11 of the Board of Liquor Control together,
there is no dear intention to limit permits in a subdivision to a number less
than those issued and outstanding.
Authority for the Enactment of Rules
Basic to the consideration of the authority to enact rules and regulations
is the existence of statutory authority vested in any administrative body
created by statute. The statutory authority is the source of rule-making and
also determines its scope; unless it can reasonably be found in the statute,
the agency does not possess rule-making authority.' However, the rules
validly enacted and properly promulgated by an agency have the effect of
statutes1 o
When the discretion vested in a board is to be exercised relative to the
establishment of rules and regulations within the police power for the
protection of health, safety, or general welfare, and it is impossible or im-
practicable to provide legislative standards, the adoption of such rules and
regulations is not an exercise of legislative power. This principle has
been held especially applicable to the regulation of horse racing and legal-
ized wagering thereon; it is a field where potential evils abound and the
General Assembly cannot be expected to anticipate the complex prob-
lems of regulation. In the case of racing this rule-making power extends
to regulations covering both the running of the horses and pari-mutuel
wagering. The fact that the regulations of the state racing commission go
beyond the statutory restriction is unimportant as long as those rules are
consistent with and do not subvert the statute." Also a regulation of the
Department of Liquor Control was sustained, despite its reference to specific
conduct which was in excess of anything mentioned in the authorizing
statute.'
2
The adoption of regulations under an enabling statute is a matter of dis-
cretion with the administrative agency. A court will not interfere with the
discretion of the agency in determining whether new regulations are neces-
sary. 3  Before a court will intervene, it must be dearly shown that the
'Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 162 Ohio St. 86, 120 N.E.2d 719 (1954).
*Kenwood Country Club v. Board of Liquor Control, 122 N.E.2d 425 (Franklin
Com. P. 1953).
:' Standard "Tote," Inc. v. Ohio State Racing Commission, 121 N..2d 463 (Frank-
lin Com. P. 1954).
'American Wine & Beverage Co., Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 116 N.E.2d 220
(Ohio App. 1951).
"Pepperidge Farm, Inc. v. Foust, 117 N.E.2d 724 (Franklin Com. PL 1953). The
plaintiff was seeking to compel the Director of Agriculture to issue regulations under
1955]
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agency is acting on a dearly erroneous interpretation of the law, and all
doubts will be resolved in favor of the correctness of the construction of
the law -by the officer charged with enforcement.
An administrative agency may not, however, impose a penalty where
neither the constitution of the state nor any legislation imposes one. Thus,
it was held erroneous for the Board of Liquor Control to suspend a permit
for violation of Rule No. 53 prohibiting any licensee from possessing upon
the premises any tickets which may or can be used for gaming or wager-
ing, or allowing or conducting gaming or wagering or any game of chance
or skill. 14
Jurisdiction
Several cases presented problems in the area of administrative jurisdic-
tion. One decision was concerned with an internal jurisdictional problem
of the Department of Liquor Control.15 The members of the Board of Liquor
Control were cited for contempt of the court of common pleas for failure to
obey a court order requiring them to order the Director of Liquor Control to
renew a liquor permit. It was determined that they were not in contempt
because the order directed them to take action -beyond their lawful authority.
Under the statutory adminstrative set-up in the Department of Liquor Con-
trol, applications for renewal of permits must be made to the Director of
the Department, and the Board does not act except on appeal.
It was also argued in this case that the court of common pleas had juris-
diction under the Administrative Procedure Act 6 to enter whatever order
the director should have made under the circumstances. However, the ap-
pellate court held that the director was without power to renew a permit at
an undesignated place, to be held in escrow, and likewise the court of com-
mon -pleas in reviewing his action was powerless to order a renewal.
Ohio Revised Code Section 911.18 despite his apparent determination that rules and
regulations were unnecessary in the enforcement of the section.4 Dayton Gymnastic Club v. Board of Liquor Control, 112 N.E.2d 569 (Franklin
Com. Pl. 1953). This court relied upon a prior decision of the court of appeals, Co-
lumbus v. Barr, 111 N.E.2d 593 (Ohio App. 1953) which had held that the carry-
ing on of keno (bingo) in all of its constituent parts is not a criminal offense unless
it is carried on for profit, striking down a municipal ordinance as in conflict with
General Code Section 13064 because it omitted the words "for his own profit" which
the state statute includes. Oio REv. CODE § 2915.12.
In the principal case the proceeds from the "bingo" operations were used in the
Club's pet charitable project, affording aid to under-privileged children.
='Socotch v. Krebs, 97 Ohio App. 8, 119 N.E.2d 309 (1954).
"Ohio Revised Code Section 119.12 provides that the court of common pleas, on
appeal, may revise, vacate or modify the order or make such of its ruling final as is
supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with
law.
[spring
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Another decision17 presents a good example of the primary exclusive
jurisdiction of an administrative agency, holding that all issues concerning
the construction, validity or constitutionality of the the orders and regula-
tions of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio must be submitted to that
body first, and that a court of general jurisdiction has no jurisdiction what-
ever under the Ohio statutes to determine the validity of its orders or en-
tertain' injunction suits to restrain a utility from shutting off a gas supply
pursuant to an order of the Public Utilities Commission. The only court
in the state which may hear such a controversy is the supreme court.'
8
In another decision the supreme court'9 held that the Public Utilities
Commission has continuing jurisdiction over its orders and may amend any
order it makes, and where the Commission is considering the validity of a
rate as to a single commodity, it has discretion in the fixing of such a rate
to base it upon matters other than the valuation of the property of the rail-
road and the actual cost of operation.
The Hearing Before the Administrative Agency
1. Parties
The Administrative Procedure Act2 ° requires the agency to give notice
to the "party" informing him of his right to a hearing. Party2' is defined
to mean and include the persons whose interests are the subject of an ad-
judication ,by an agency.
A receiver of the property of a permit holder is not a "party" within
the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act.22 The liquor permit
is not a property right nor a contract; the most that it constitutes is a mere
permission to engage in the liquor business, and the receiver has no inter-
est in a revocation proceeding regarding it.
2. Burden of Proof
While the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act is silent on the matter,
a court of appeals has stated that it is implicit in the Act that a party assert-
ing the affirmative of an issue bears the burden of proof in an adjudicative
proceeding. Thus the Department of Industrial Relations in ordering
"Pottorf v. East Ohio Gas Co., 96 Ohio App. 457, 122 N.E.2d 416 (1948).
"OrIo REV. CODE §§ 4903.12 and 4903.13.
"Toledo Edison Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 161 Ohio St. 221, 118 N.E.2d
531 (1954).
"OHIO REV. CODE S 119.07. The giving of notice is not required where hearing
will be had only on request of a party.
=Oio Ray. CODE § 119.01 (G).
'Meyer v. Board of Liquor Control, 119 N.E.2d 156 (Franklin Corn. Pl. 1954).
f"9551
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changes and the adoption of new types of construction has the affirmative
of the issue, with the right to open and dose with evidence and argument.
The director of the department could not shift this burden to the respondent
by the issuance of a "show cause" order, since such a procedure is not au-
thorized by the Ohio statutes and cannot be legally used in the absence of
express statutory authorization. 23 The court, in holding that the hearing
denied due process of law, relied heavily upon an analoguous situation under
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act2 4 and on federal judicial au-
thority.25
In considering whether the burden of proof has been sustained the ad-
ministrative agency is the trier of the facts and must be the sole judge of
the credibility of witnesses. The agency has the duty to determine what
witnesses are to be believed, which are the most worthy of belief, and to draw
-from the credible testimony reasonable inferences.26 However, on appeal,
despite this duty of being the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses,
the reviewing court has a duty to find that the order of the agency is sup-
ported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence upon the considera-
tion of the entire record.27
Judicial Review - Parties to An Appeal
The supreme court reaffirmed its previous position2 that it was not the
intention of the legislature in enacting the Administrative Procedure Act to
give a right of appeal to the administrative agency from an adverse ruling
of a court of common pleas on its decisions, and sustained a motion to dis-
miss the appeal of the director of education and the high school board
from a judgment of the court of common pleas rendered on appeal from an
order of the Department of Education.29  The agency must find express
=Goodyear Synthetic Rubber Corp. v. Department of Industrial Relations, 122
N.E.2d 503 (Franklin Corn. P1. 1954).
'5 USCA § 1006 (c), providing generally that the proponent of a rule or order
shall have the burden of proof.
'Philadelphia Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 175 F.2d 808 (D.C.
Cir. 1948); judgment vacated with directions to dismiss the petition for review as
moot, on joint motion of counsel for the parties. Securities & Exchange Commission
v. Philadelphia Co., 337 U.S. 901, 69 Sup. Ct. 1047 (1949).
'American Wine & Beverage Co. v. Board of Liquor Control, 119 N.E.2d 220
(Ohio App. 1951)..
' American Legion Clifton Post No. 421 v. Board of Liquor Control, 122 N.E.2d
420 (Franklin Com. P1. 1954).
SCorn v. Board of Liquor Control, 160 Ohio St. 9, 113 N.E.2d 360 (1953). See
5 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 227, 229 (1954).
'lo re Millcreek Local District High School, 160 Ohio St. 234, 115 N.E.2d 840
(1953); In re Roundhead Local District High School, 160 Ohio St. 240, 115 N.E.2d
841 (1953).
[spring
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statutory authority to file an appeal. However, express authorization to
appeal is not jurisdictional, and where an agency in fact appeals, there being
no objection to its prosecution, and the appeal is heard and judgment
rendered, the judgment is valid and cannot be attacked on jurisdictional
grounds. It was held that an appeal by the Board of Liquor Control from
an adverse decision in the court of common pleas presented subject matter
over which the court of appeals had jurisdiction, and since the appellants
proceeded in such manner as to constitute approval of the appeal, they
waived their right to raise the question of jurisdiction over the parties after
judgment.30
Time for Appeal
In the absence of a specific date applicable to. the agency by special
statutory provision, the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act requires that
notice of appeal shall be filed within fifteen days after the mailing of the
notice of the agency's order. This was held jurisdictional in an appeal from
a decision of. the Board of Liquor Control.31
Scope of Review
Sometimes a question arises whether an appeal presents a moot ques-
tion and should be dismissed without any decision on the merits. Such a
situation arose in connection with an application for the renewal of a per-
mit filed with the Department of Liquor Control. The department had
denied renewal because of lack of suitable premises, and the Board of Liquor
control had on appeal dismissed that action because there was now no per-
mit in existence and therefore the matter was moot. The court of appeals
reversed an affirmance by the court of common pleas, holding that the mat-
ter was not moot because the rights of the appellanr became fixed as of the
date of the appeal from the department to the board, and had the appeal
been favorably acted upon there would have been some time left in which to
attempt to take measures to procure a proper establishment, stating that a
question only becomes moot when it is purely academic or abstract and
any judgment whatever which might be rendered thereon would in no way
avail or be beneficial to any of the parties.32
"Mantho v. Board of Liquor Control, 162 Ohio St. 37, 120 N.E.2d 730 (1954).
'Hart v. Board of Liquor Control, 96 Ohio App. 128, 121 N.E.2d 257 (1953).
The mistake of the appellant was in waiting until a decision on his motion for a
rehearing before the administrative agency. His notice of appeal was filed within
fifteen days from notice of the decision on rehearing but more than fifteen days
after the mailing of the notice of the agency's decision on the original hearing.
2Artists & Writers Ass'n v. State Department of Liquor Control, 96 Ohio App. 121,
121 N.E.2d 263 (1953).
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The Administrative Procedure Act3s authorizes an appellate court to
take additional evidence when it is newly discovered and could not rea-
sonably have been obtained prior to the agency hearing. This section of the
statute is not, however, invoked by a motion to complete the record. Also
for the success of such a motion a proper foundation must be laid by making
a demand on the agency for the completion of the record.34 Normally, the
hearing of the appeal is confined to the record as certified to it by the
agency.35
The Administrative Procedure Act does not contemplate a de novo
trial of the matter which was before the agency but only a review of its
action. The court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administra-
tive agency.3 6
As a result of the hearing on appeal the court may affirm the order of
the agency if it finds, from a consideration of the entire record and such
additional evidence as may have been admitted before it by special order,
that the agency action is supported by reliable, probative and substantial
evidence and is in accordance with law.3 7 Several cases reviewing the de-
cisions of the Board of Liquor Control afford practical applications of the
function of the reviewing court.38
If, on the other hand, the reviewing court does not find the required
statutory support for the order, it may either reverse, vacate, or modify the
order or make such appropriate ruling as is supported by reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.39 An examination
of the reversals of the Board of Liquor Control reported during the period
covered by this study shows that the main ground for failure to sustain the
"OHIO REV. CODE § 119.12.
'Vito v. Board of Liquor Control, 122 N.E.2d 121 (Franklin Com. Pl. 1953).
"OHIO REv. CODE § 119.12.
Napolet v. Board of Liquor Control, 119 N.E.2d 93 (Ohio App. 1953); Hermelin
v. Board of Liquor Control, 120 N.E.2d 471 (Ohio App. 1953).
"OHIO REv. CODE § 119.12. Fawcet v. Board of Liquor Control, 118 N.E.2d 697
(Franklin Com. P1. 1953).
'Department of Liquor Control v. Sassier, 120 N.E.2d 332 (Ohio App. 1951);
State Board of Liquor Control v. Jackson, 120 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio App. 1951);
A.E.F. Veterans Ass'n, 37th Division v. Board of Liquor Control, 94 Ohio App.
550, 116 N.E.2d 750 (1950); State v. Sassier, 121 N.E.2d 116 (Franklin Com. PL
1951); Henderson v. Rutkowski, 121 N.E.2d 665 (Franklin Com. Pl. 1954); Rio
Bar, Inc. v. State, 117 N.E.2d 522 (Franklin Com. P1. 1954); 1-1 re Sons Bars &
Grills Co., 117 N.E.2d 526 (Franklin Com. P1. 1954); Mozingo v. Board of Liquor
Control, 118 N.E.2d 926 (Franklin Com. P1. 1954); Cavalier v. Board of Liquor
Control, 119 N.E.2d 131 Franklin Com. P1. 1954); Mastroianni v. Board of Liquor
Control, 119 N.E.2d 140 (Franklin Com. P1. 1954); Morton v. Board of Liquor
Control, 119 N.E.2d 140 (Franklin Com. P1. 1954).
"OHIO REV. CODE § 119.12.
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board's action was lack of sufficient evidence in the record.40 These cases
also show that the reviewing court simply reverses the board more often
than it undertakes to issue the order which the evidence and the law require.
Rehearing
Authority for rehearing by the reviewing court is not predicated on the
Administrative Procedure Act. The office of such a motion is to direct
the court's attention to matters of 'fact or law that have not been given at-
tendon, and it is not for the purpose of reargument of the appeal on the
entire record. No oral argument is permitted on application for rehearing
of the appeal.41 The court has, however, given attention to a -brief filed in
support of the rehearing and has reexamined its original decision during
the process of decision on the motion for rehearing.4 2
Review Outside the Administrative Procedure Act
The Ohio act does not apply to certain important agencies such as the
Public Utilities Commission, the superintendent of banks, superintendent
of building and loan associations, and the superintendent of insurance.' 3
While it does apply to some of the functions of the department of taxation,
the appeals section of the Ohio act specifically excepts the department of
taxation (Board of Tax Appeals) from its provisions.44 Therefore judicial
"State v. Slaughter, 122 N.E.2d 487 (Ohio App. 1953); Smith v. Board of Liquor
Control, 96 Ohio App. 396, 121 N.E.2d 920 (1954); Cannon's Estate v. Board ofLiquor Control, 120 N.E.2d 478 (Franklin Com. Pl. 1953); Mallett v. Board of
Liquor Control, 121 N.E2d 139 (Franklin Com. Pl. 1953); Chudde v. Board of
Liquor Control, 117 N.E.2d 60 (Franklin Com. P1. 1953); Ashford v. Board of
Liquor Control, 121 N.E.2d 164 (Franklin Com. PL. 1954); Chateau Cafe v. De-
partment of Liquor Control, 119 N.E.2d 137 (Franklin Com. P1. 1954); Brewer v.
Board of Liquor Control, 116 N.E.2d 465 (Franklin Com. Pl. 1953). The case of
Page v. Board of Liquor Control, 121 N.E.2d 125 (Ohio App. 1954), reversed the
order of the board, but on an interpretation of the agency's own regulations. A
regulation of the board provided that applications pending 45 days or more are
deemed to have been rejected. Reading this regulation with others in pari materia
it was decided that only valid applications not previously rejected by action of the
department or by operation of law, ire to be processed in the order in which they
are filed. The board was therefore directed to receive and process applications for
new permits which are filed and pending with it, in accordance with law.
'Weintraub v. Board of Liquor Control, 122 N.E.2d 511 (Franklin Com. Fl.
1953).
" Leganshuk v. Department of Liquor Control, 120 N.E.2d 333 (Franklin Com. P1.
1953).
" O-O REv. CODE § 119.01 (A).
OIo REv. CODi § 119.12. Ohio Revised Code Section 5703.01 refers to the De-
partnent of Taxation as being composed of the Tax Commissioner and the Board
of Tax Appeals.
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review of these agencies, if any, must be procured through the specific
statutes applicable to them.
Statutes provide for a review of the Public Utilities Commission and
the Board of Tax Appeals by the supreme court. As a matter of procedure,
the statute requires that the appellant must set forth his grounds of objec-
tion to the utilities commission's order in his application for rehearing
before that body.45 In the City of Marion case"' the supreme court dis-
missed a portion of an appeal -because the assignment of error before the
commission was too general to constitute compliance with the statutory
basis for appeal. Also the Public Utilities Commission is required by
statute4 7 in every contested case to file a written opinion setting forth the
reasons justifying the decision arrived at by the Commission, together with
a resume from the record of the facts upon which its decision is based.
The supreme court held48 that a formal finding of facts by the Commission
which adopted the report of its secretary, which report in turn contained
the accounting reports of the Commission auditors and the reports of the
Commission engineers, was sufficient compliance with the statute.
Appeals from the Board of Tax Appeal go directly to the supreme court.
That court has held that in reviewing the board where it has held a de novo
hearing and has made a finding of fact, it will not disturb the findings of
the board unless the particular determination is unreasonable. 9
Effect of Adoption of Revised Code On
Administrative Regulations Issued Pursuant to the
General Code
A licensee whose liquor permit had been revoked for alleged violation of
a liquor department regulation promulgated under the General Code
charged that the regulations had not been re-promulgated under the Revised
Code and were therefore void at the time of his hearing which was after
October 1, 1953, the effective date of the Revised Code. The reviewing
court,"0 relying heavily upon Revised Code Section 1.01 which saves rights
and liabilities generally that -have accrued or been incurred under the Gen-
eral Code prior to the effective date of the- Revised Code and continues the
'5 OHio REV. CODE § 4903.10.
"Marion v. Public Utilities Commission, 161 Ohio St. 276, 119 N.E.2d 67 (1954).
Omo REv. CoDE § 4903.09.
"Buckeye Lake Chamber of Commerce v. Public Utilities Commission, 161 Ohio St.
306, 119 N.E.2d 51 (1954).
"Montgomery County v. Budget Commission of Montgomery County, 160 Ohio St.
263, 116 N.E.2d 1 (1953). The statute providing for appeal from the Board of
Tax Appeals to the Supreme Court is Revised Code Section 5717.04.
'Meyer v. Board of Liquor Control, 119 N.E.2d 156 (Franklin Com. P1. 1954).
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